Threat Modeling the System That Actually Exists
A useful threat model tracks live trust boundaries, administration paths, transition states, recovery systems, evidence dates, and the changes that made the old model wrong.
A useful threat model tracks live trust boundaries, administration paths, transition states, recovery systems, evidence dates, and the changes that made the old model wrong.
A practical policy and configuration guide for detecting prompt injection and jailbreak attempts before inference, then blocking unsafe content and sensitive-data disclosure before model output reaches a user, tool, or application.
After reading my post on AI firewalls, a friend asked for my take on prompt injection. Prompt injection becomes dangerous when untrusted content can steer a software principal into using authority that the content never possessed.
A hands-on review of Ken VanDine and Jay LaCroix's practical guide to Ubuntu Server 26.04, based on the supplied Early Review Copy.
A reader of the Cybersecurity Architect's Handbook Second Edition recently asked whether the Kubernetes sidecar pattern discussed in Chapter 13 applies only when an organization hosts its own large language model. The short answer is no.
Seeing a well-read copy of Cybersecurity Architect’s Handbook, Second Edition out in the wild never gets old.
Part 2 puts the security in motion: services, the monitoring pipeline your log lines feed, wireless done currently, safe remote access, and where it all leads.
Network security is controls placed where traffic must pass. Part 1 builds the floor: addressing, switching, routing, and your first enforcement reps.
Part 1, The Machine and Its Evidence established one working rule: the GUI shows you what exists, and PowerShell is how you inspect it precisely and repeat the work across ten machines. Windows Server administration assumes you are somewhere else...